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IN TUE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELDON L. ANDERSON, dba 
SILVER DOLLAR LOUNGE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, YUKUS Y. 
INOUYE, KARL R. LYMAN, 
and KENNETH J. PINEGAR, 
as Commissioners, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 15653 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant initiated this action in the Fourth 
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, praying 
for an Extraordinary Writ to review and reverse the ruling 
by the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County which 
denied the appellant a business license. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth DistriC't Court, in and for Utah County. 
State of Utah, the Uonorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge 
presiding, entered its Order dismissing the plaintiff/appella111 I 
complaint, no cause of action, on the basis that the Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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County Commission has the absolute authority to deny the 
issuance of a Class B Beer license without cause. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmation of the District 
Court's decision and findings that the Utah County Commission 
has absolute authority to deny issuing a Class B Beer license 
without cause. Respondents seek an order denying appellant's 
request for a restraining order pending the final determination 
of the plaintiff/appellant's second cause of action, in the 
event that this Court upholds the Lower Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents respectfully disagree with the 
statement of facts as presented to this Court in the Brief 
of the Appellant in the following areas: 
1. Page 3. Appellant states that the Sheriff was 
proceeding under Section 7-6-2 of the Utah County Ordinances 
when he refused to rrcommend approval of the appellant's 
license. In fact, the Sheriff was proceeding under Section 
4-2-6 of the Utah County Ordinances, wherein the following 
language is found: 
"The application for such license, together .with 
such information and certificate as is required 
by the County to be attached theret~, shall be 
referred to the Sheriff for inspection and report. 
The said Sheriff shall, within five days aft:r 
receiving such application, make report to t e 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i ·.' 
Commission of lhe g<'nl'ral rpputation and charactpr 
of the persons who habitually frequent such' placf'. 
the nature and kind of businPss conducted at 
such plan-' by the applicant, or by any other person 
or by said applicant at any other place; whether 
said place is or has been conducted in a lawful, 
quiet and orderly mannPr; the nature and kind of 
entertainment, if any, al said place, whether 
gambling is or has bPen p<•rmitted upon the premisr, 
or by said applicant at any other place; and he 
shall add thereto hh; recommendation as to granting I 
or denying said appliC'ation. Upon receipt of said 1' 
report, the Commission shall act upon the applicatio· 
as it sha 11 deem fair. just and proper in regard to I 
granting or denying the same." · 
2. Page 3. Appellant alleges that no specific 
charges were ever filed against the appellant by the Utah 
County Attorney or the Sheriff regarding the premises being 
a nuisance. However, specific charges were filed against the 
appellant for serving beer to minors in violation of 
municipal ordinance and state law. The appellant 
in City Court, but the conviction was reversed on 
was convictea f 
appeal to I 
the Fourth District Court on the grounds of entrapment. 
I 
3. Page 4. Utah County Attorney merely stipulat~ 
to certain facts in the appellant's Memorandum of Authorities 
(R-8, 9, 10) and not to the Memorandum of Authorities in its 
entirety. The remaining Statement of Facts as set forth in 
appellant's Brief appear to be correct. 
! l ARGUMENT 
· i' '·~ :-. ·: L 
\ t: J 
POINT I 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
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THE UTAH COUNTY COMMISSIONERS HAD THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO DENY 
APPELLANT'S CLASS B BEER LICENSE. 
Section 32-4-17 UCA ( 1953) confers upon the County 
the authority to rPgulate thP sale of light beer. This section 
reads in part as follows: 
"Cities and towns within their corporate limits 
and counties outside of incorporated cities and' 
towns shall have power to license, tax, regulate 
or prohibit the sale of light beer, at retail in 
bottles or draft; provided, that no such lice~ses 
shall be granted to sell beer in any dance hall, 
theater or in the proximity of any church or school. 
The commission granting the license shall have 
authority to detf~rmine in each case what shall 
constitute proximity." (emphasis added) 
It appears to be well settled that a state may 
delegate power to regulate and prohibit the sale of alcoholic 
beverages. State v. Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 P. 261. 
The appellant contends that the power to regulate 
and prohibit Class B Beer license by the County Commission 
is limited and that they may not absolutely refuse to issue 
licenses for the sale of beer. The great weight of authority 
holds that procedural due process nePd not be afforded where a 
liquor license is r:evoke.d or denied. State ex. rel. Garrett 
V. Randall, 527 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Mo.1975); Smith v. Iowa 
Liquor Control Commission, 169 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Iowa 1959); 
Nelson v. Hopper, 383 P.2d 588, 590 (Idaho 1963). 
The rationale for this general rule is stated in 
2 A.L.R.2d 1239, at page 1242: 
4 
' i 
I 
rl I~ 
1f 
I 
I 
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"It is well settlPd that licenses issued for the 
sale of intoxicating liquors or beverages have no 
quality of a eontracL or of property, but are merelv 
temporary permits to do what otherwise would be an· 
offense against th<' law - that such a license is a 
mere privi legr to carry on a busin(~Ss subject to the 
will or the grantor. and is not a contract betwe(•n 
the licensee and the govrrnment, or property or a 
vested right." 
In Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288 (1950) the Suprernfl 
o/ Court ruled that the legislature intended that the sale of light[ 
I 
beer be regulated solely by the State Liquor Commission and 
local authorities. The Court indicated that a beer license 
constitutes no property interest. The liquor license is merely 
a privilege conferred upon a licensee and subject to denial 
without affording due process at the will of the grantor. 
Court cited 46-0-131 UCA (1943) which is essentially the same 
as 32-4-17 UCA (1953), supra. 
. I 
The appellant is proceeding under the mistaken not1m1 
that the criteria for denying his application is founded in .I 
7-6-1 and 7-6-2 of the Utah County Revised Ordinances. Section> 
7-6-1 and 7-6-2 concern revocation and do not address the 
issue presently be fore the Court, namely, the procedural 
requirements for granting <>r denying application for beer 
licenses. The applicable ordinance is 4-2-6 as stated supra 
in the defendant's Statement of Facts. This ordianance contain> 
no provision that the commission exercise an objective standa~ 
of due process in making their determination nor is there any 
state statute which so provides. 
5 
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In Riggins~ _ _[Li_strict Court of Salt Lake Cit}'.. 
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645, thr· Court made it perfectly clear 
that the StatP had th<' authority to prohibit it's inhabitant 8 
from importing liquor into designated places where such 
liquors were sold illegally as common nuisances. Such 
authority has bePn conferred un the State Liquor Commission 
under the Liquor Control Act and conferred upon the County 
under Section 32-4-1 UCA ( 1953). The exercise of this 
authority is not contrary to any U.S. constitutional provision. 
The Court in Riggins supra further went on to say that the 
legislature intended to vest full power to control the liquor 
business in the Liquor Commission. This same power is also 
conferred upon the towns, cities and counties under Section 
32-4-17 UCA (1953). ·section 32-4-8 UCA (1953) is indicative 
of this legislative intent. It reads as follows: 
"The Commission, with or without a hearing, may at 
its discretion refuse to grant any license or 
permit applied for, and may revoke any license or 
permit at any time; and in no such case need any 
cause be stated. The acts of the Commission in 
giving or withholding consent or in granting, 
denying, or revoking licenses or permits s~all not 
be subject to any review whatever, except in the 
cases in which such action has been procured by fraud. 
If at any time a licensee or permittee.shall cea~e to 
possess all of the qualifications requir:d by this 
act it shall be the duty of the Commission to 
rev~ke his license or permit. All li~enses and t 
permits shall have incorporated therein ~he statemen 
that they are granted subject to revocation as 
provided in this act." 
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Historically the liquor business has not stood in 
the same plane as other public administrative agencies, and 
the ruling of the Fourth District Court should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THAT EVEN IF DUE PROCESS IS A REQUIREMENT TO TURN 
DOWN AN APPLICATION FOR A CLASS B BEER LICENSE, APPELLANT WAS 
NOT DENIED ANY RIGHT TO WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED, NOR DID THE 
COUNTY COMMISSION ACT ARBITRARILY OR CAPRICIOUSLY. 
Assuming arguendo that the County Commission is 
subject to the same restrictions and the same criteria as 
other administrative agencies in granting or denying license 
applications, in this particular action of the Commission the 
denial of the application submitted by appellant was based on 
substantial evidence and thus it cannot be said that the 
decision of the Commission was arbitrary or capricious. 
The general rule concerning judicial review of 
.administrative hearings other than those pertaining to liquor 
control, appears to be best stated in 42 Am Jur2nd "Public 
Administration" Section 209 at Page 610: 
"In general, in the absence of valid statutory 
provisions or other factors affecting the scope 
and extent of judicial review, administrative 
determinations will not be interferred with by 
the courts unless, but will interfere with where, 
the determination is beyond the power which could 
constitutionally be vested in or exercised by 
an administrative authority; the determination is 
without or in excess of the statutory powers and 
jurisdiction of the administrative authority, 
the determination is in exercise of power so 
arbitrary or unreasonable as virtually to transcend 
7 
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the authority conferred, or is otherwise an abuse 
of discreti6n, or is in disregard of the fundamental 
rules_of ~ne due process of law, as required by the 
const1tut1on or statutory directions ... " 
In Central Bank and Trust Company v. Brimhall, 
28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P.2d 638, the plaintiff (Central Bank) 
appealled the decision of the Bank Commissioner which granted 
an application to First Security Corporation to establish a 
bank in Springville, Utah, but denied the application of the 
plaintiff. Central Bank contended that the decision of the 
Commissioner was arbitrary and capricious. In affirming the 
Commissioner's findings, the Utah Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
"Our duty is to look upon the whole evidence in 
the light favorable to the determination made by 
the Bank Commissioner in the trial court, and to 
sustain them if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence to justify doing so." (at 641) 
The Court further went on to say: 
" ... (T]he well established rule is that the courts 
iuau1ge [the Commissioner] latitude in determinations 
he makes on questions of fact and also in the 
exercise of his discretion with respect to the 
responsibilities which the law imposes upon him; 
and they will not interfere therewith unless it 
appears that he acted in excess of his powers, or· 
that he so abused his discretion that his action was 
capricious or arbitrary." (at 641) 
This quote (reasonable basis) spoken of in Central 
Bank supra was earlier defined as the "substantial evidence" 
in Uintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Commission, 119 Utah 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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491, 229 P.2d 675, wherein the Court stated: 
"It is not required that the facts found by the 
Commission be conclusively established, nor even 
that they be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence. If there is in the record competent 
evidence from which a reasonable mind could believe 
or conclude that a certain fact existed, a finding 
of such facts finds justification in the evidence, 
and we cannot disturb it." (at 677) 
Mulchay v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 
117 P.2d 298, 299. This substantial evidence test was again 
applied in Zions First National Bank v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 
239, 390 P.2d 854, (1964) where the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Commissioner's decision and ruled that the Courts will not 
overrule the Commissioner's decision if supported by "any 
substantial evidence" and is not arbitrary or capricious, 
Id at 855. This substantial evidence rule is also set out in 
Davis Administrative Law Text, Section 29.01 at 525 (1972). 
It should be noted again that the case presently 
before the Court deals with the denial of an application and 
not with the revocation of a beer license. A previous license 
granted by the Commission to the appellant was terminated by 
the terms of the license and not by some affirmative revocation 
procedure. 
A failure to grant a license is inherent and the 
applicant should be reasonably aware of such. The appellant 
cites authorities which are concerned with the issue of 
revocation and then applied these holdings to the issue of 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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application denial as presently before the Court. A revocation 
and a denial of an application are clearly distinguishable. 
35 A.L.R.2d 1067, 1068; Casala v. Dio, 13 A.2d 693, 65 RI 96 
(1940). 
In Richardson v. Perales 402 U.S. 389, 91 s. Ct. 
1420, (1970), the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
reports in administrative hearings are admissible and may 
constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding made 
by a hearing examiner against a claimant despite its heresay 
character, absence of cross examination and presence of opposing 
direct testimony by the claimant himself. In Richardson supra, 
the Court ruled that the level of due process required in 
administrative hearings is flexible and may vary. At page 
1427, the Court stated: 
"The extent to which procedural due process must 
be afforded the recipient is influenced by the 
extent to which he may be condemned to suffer 
grevious loss. Accordingly consideration of what 
procedures due process may require under any given 
set of circumstances must begin with a determination 
of the precise nature of the government function 
involved as well as the private interest that has 
been affected by governmental action." 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263, 90 S Ct. 
1011, 1018, 25 L. ed. 2d 287 (1970). The Court further went 
on to hold that the evidence need only be relevant to be 
admitted. That the hearing should be informal so as to be 
understandable by the layman claimant and that the decision of 
10 
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the hearing examiner be supported by substantial evidence. 
The Supreme Court went on to define "substantial evidence" as 
being "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." (at 1427) 
In the case presently before the Court, the County 
Commission granted the appellant two administrative hearings, 
and based its decision upon substantial evidence. At the 
time of both hearings, the Commissioners had before them a 
copy of the Sheriff's recommendation and copies of official 
incident and offense police reports concerning the Silver Doi~ 
Lounge. These official reports indicated that over a six 
month period, the Sheriff's department had been summoned to the 
appellant's place of business to quiet disturbances and/or 
make arrests. In addition, Officer Scott testified at the 
August 6th, 1976 hearing, of violations he personally 
encountered while conducting spot checks on the premises. The ' 
administrative record also shows that the appellant admitted 
the following: 
1. That he was convicted of a felony. Utah County 
Ordinance Section 4-2-7 holds that a convicted felon cannot 
qualify for a beer license. 
2. That the appellant had permitted minors on 
11 
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premises in violation of Utah County Ordinance Section 
4-2-18. 
3. That the appellant did willfully sell beer to 
patrons after hours in violation of County Ordianances. 
The findings and the admissions stated above 
constitutes sufficient grounds for the denial of a Class B 
Beer license by the County Commission. The record clearly 
indicated that the County Commission had before it substantial 
evidence from which to justify their denial. 
Pehrson v. City Council of Ephraim, 14 Utah 147, 
46 P. 657, is cited by the appellant in his brief as authority 
for his position. However, Pehrson dealt with the issue of 
revocation and, in addition, the decision of the Court was 
based upon an 1892 statute which is no longer law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the 
Trial Court should be affirmed: 
1. The State of Utah has conferred upon it's 
Counties the absolute authority to grant or deny applications 
for beer licenses. 
2. Even if the County did not have absolute 
authority, the County Commission did not act arbitrarily nor 
did it act capriciously in denying the application of the 
appellant. After affording appellant due process, the 
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decision of the respondent is supported by substantial eviden~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
Guy R. Burningham 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondents 
60 South University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to Matt Biljanic, Attorney for Appellut. 
7355 South 9th East, Midvale, Utah, 84047, postage prepaid, 
this day of 
Guy R. Burningham 
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